DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN--- English essay
By liesurenotebook
Part1:
Democracy and participatory governance are popular political notions in today’s world. Fair and free
elections are the key pre-requisite of democracy. However, democracy lacks substance unless the electoral
process is coupled with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and civil and political rights and
freedoms for the people. The state must practice the principle of equal citizenship irrespective of religion,
caste, ethnicity and regional background. It must also ensure equality of opportunity to all for
advancement in social, economic and political domains and guarantee security of life and property of its
citizens.
While it easy for the rulers, political leaders and parties, and others to pronounce their commitment to
these principles, the real challenge lies in making them operational. The key question is how does one
create and sustain institutions and processes that reflect the spirit of democracy and participatory
governance? A large number of states are unable to fulfill these conditions. The commitment of many
rulers, leaders, and organizations to democracy is merely rhetorical or they view democracy as an
instrument to achieve power and then implement a partisan non-democratic agenda. Others selectively
employ some aspects of democracy to create a façade. Still others hold elections, establish elected
legislative bodies and install elected governments but do not empower these institutions and the people
holding key positions in them. Power is thus exercised by an elite group while a semblance of democracy is
created to legitimize its rule. These operational realities create the problem of quality and substance of
democracy.
Professed Values and Operational Realities:
In Pakistan, the rulers, political parties and leaders and the civil society groups support democracy at the
normative or conceptual level. The politically active circles demand representative governance and
participatory decision making in the political and economic fields. They highlight fair and free electoral
process, the rule of law, socio-economic justice and accountability of those exercising state power as the
pre-requisites for a political system.
However, there are serious problems with these principles at the operational level in Pakistan. Power
structure and style of governance often negated these principles. Most rulers, civilian and military,
pursued personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance, assigning a high premium to
personal loyalty and uncritical acceptance of what the ruler or the party chief decides. .This was coupled
with partisan use of state apparatus and resources, and an elitist and exploitative socio-economic system.
A conflict between the professed democratic values and the operational realities of authoritarianism and
non-sustainable civilian institutions and processes is the main feature of Pakistani political experience. The
redeeming feature of this conflict is that despite the long spells of authoritarian and military rule, the
theoretical commitment to democracy and participatory governance has persisted in Pakistan. None of the
two political trends has been able to overwhelm each other. If democracy could not function on a
continuous basis, the authoritarian and military rule did not get accepted as a normal or legitimate
political system. This engenders the hope that the over all commitment to democracy would continue to
persist as one of the most cherished norms in the polity and a governance system that falters on
democracy would not be able to cultivate voluntary popular support.
The failure to institutionalize participatory governance has caused much alienation at the popular level.
A good number of people feel that they are irrelevant to power management at the federal and provincial
levels. The rulers are so engrossed in their power game that they are not bothered about the interest and
welfare of the common people. Such a perception of low political efficacy is reflected in the declining
voting percentage in the general elections. A good number of voters maintain that their vote does not
matter much in the selection of the rulers. Invariably they express negative views about the rulers as well
as those opposing them. Despite all this, the people have not given up on democracy. While talking about
their ‘helplessness’ with reference to changing the rulers, they continue to subscribe to the norms of
democracy and participatory governance and emphasize the accountability of the rulers. They are
therefore vulnerable to mobilization for realization of these norms and values.
The political system of Pakistan is characterized by intermittent breakdown of constitution and political
order, weak and non-viable political institutions and processes, rapid expansion of the role of the militarybureaucratic elite, military rule and military dominated civilian governments, and authoritarian and
narrow-based power management.
Pakistan’s political history can be divided into different phases with reference to the dominant style of
governance and political management:
1. Civilian political government: August 1947-October 1958
December 1971-July 1977
2. Direct Military Rule: October 1958-June 1962
March 1969-December1971
July 1977-December 1985
October 1999-November 2002
3. Selective use of Democracy by the Military (Post-military rule)
June 1962-March 1969
March 1985-November 1988
4. Military’s influence from the sidelines on policy making under civilian governments
December 1988-October 1999
5. Military’s direct involvement in power management after the end of military
rule; constitutional and legal role for the military
Historical Overview:
Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some changes to meet the
requirements of an independent state as the Interim Constitution, 1947. It provided for a parliamentary
system of government, although the governor general enjoyed special powers and the federal government
exercised some overriding powers over provinces. Pakistan’s early rulers did not pay much attention to
democratization of the political system because their major concern was how to ensure the survival of the
state in view of internal and external challenges. The fear of the collapse of the state reinforced
authoritarian governance and political management.
Pakistan faced serious administrative and management problems caused by the partition process These
included the division of civil and military assets of the British Indian government between India and
Pakistan, communal riots and the movement of population to and from Pakistan, and the troubled relations
with India, including the first war on Kashmir, 1947-48. Pakistan had to set up a federal government in
Karachi and a provincial government in Dhaka at a time when it lacked experienced civil servants and
military officers.
While Pakistan was coping with initial administrative and humanitarian problems, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
the father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen months after the establishment of Pakistan.
This set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political institutions and
fragmented the political process. Most of post-Jinnah political leaders had regional and local stature and
did not have a nationwide appeal which regionalized and localized politics. This made it difficult for the
political parties and leaders to pursue a coherent approach towards the problems and issues of the early
years. They were unable to develop consensus on the operational norms of the polity and took 8 ½ years to
frame a constitution which did not enjoy the unqualified support of all the major parties, leaders and
regions. By the time the constitution was introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of violation of
parliamentary norms was established, the political parties were divided and the assembly was unable to
assert its primacy. The effective power had shifted to the Governor General/President.The acute administrative problems, degeneration of the political parties and the inability of the political
leaders to command widespread political support enabled the governor general to amass power. He
manipulated the divided political forces and decided about the making or unmaking of governments.
Given the bureaucratic background of Governor Generals (Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55) and a combined
military and civilian-bureaucratic background of Governor General/President Iskander Mirza (1955-1958);
they could rely on the top bureaucracy and the military for support. This contributed to the rise of the
bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistani politics which further undermined the prospects of democracy.
By 1954-55, the top brass of the military (mainly the Army) emerged as the key policy makers along with
the bureaucracy. They made major input to policy making on foreign policy, security issues and domestic
affairs. By October 1958, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, overthrew the tottering civilian
government with the full support of President Iskander Mirza. The latter was knocked out of power by the
generals within 20 days of the military take-over. Since then the top brass of the military have either ruled
the country directly or influenced governance and policy management from the background.
The first military ruler, Ayub Khan, ruled the country under martial law from October 1958 to June 1962,
when he introduced a presidential constitution. Though direct military rule came to an end but the 1962
Constitution attempted to give a legal and constitutional cover to Ayub’s centralized and authoritarian rule
which did not allow the growth of autonomous civilian institutions and processes, although the state media
projected his rule as the beginning of a new era of participatory governance. His government’s political
management and economic policies accentuated economic disparities among the people and the regions
and caused much political and social alienation in parts of Pakistan, especially in what was then East
Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated Ayub’s 1962
Constitution and imposed martial law in the country. This was another troubled period in Pakistan’s
politics. The military government was unable to cope with the demands from East Pakistan for socioeconomic
equity and political participation. The military resorted to an extremely brutal military action in
East Pakistan (March 25, 1971 onwards) and engaged in a war with India (November-December 1971).
Pakistan’s military debacle at the hands of India led to the break up of the original Pakistan and the
establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. Such a major military and political setback forced
General Yahya Khan to quit and handover power on December 20, 1971 to a civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto whose Pakistan People’s Party had the largest number of the National Assembly seats in what was
left of Pakistan, i.e. the present Pakistan.
Z.A. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy over the military during his rule (December 20, 1971 to July 5, 1977)
against the backdrop of the serious damage to the military’s reputation in the wake of the military debacle
of 1971. Initially, he retired several senior officers and changed the military’s command structure.
However, his ability to assert his primacy over the military eroded when he began to cultivate the
military’s support to pursue his strident policy towards India and employed authoritarian methods to deal
with the domestic opposition. When the opposition launched anti-Bhutto agitation on the pretext that the
government had rigged the 1977 general elections, the military led General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army
Staff, had no problem in dislodging Bhutto and assuming power on July 5, 1977. The opposition parties
welcomed the military take over because it removed Bhutto from power.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law from July 1977 to December 1985 was the longest period of direct
military rule in Pakistan. He sought political support for his rule by vowing the orthodox and conservative
Islamic groups and tilted the state policies heavily in their favour. His rule was helped by his government’s
partnership with the West, especially the United States, for reinforcing Afghan-Islamic resistance to the
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. As a frontline state for the U.S. policy to dislodge the Soviet
Union from Afghanistan, General Zia’s government obtained international financial and diplomatic support
which contributed to sustaining his military rule. His policies promoted religious extremism and militancy,
undermining the prospects of social and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and processes.
These trends continued after he civilianized his military rule in 1985 by introducing far reaching changes in
the 1973 Constitution and co-opting a section of the political elite to ensure his continued centrality to governance and political management.In the post Zia period (1988-99) the elected civilian governments functioned but the top commanders
closely monitored the performance of these governments and made their views on political and security
matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sidelines provided their professional
and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders. Therefore, governance for Benazir
Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, October 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July
1993, February 1997-October 1999) was a delicate balancing act between the civilian government and the
top brass of the military. The scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders depended on
their ability to maintain cordial interaction with the top military commanders.
The military returned to power on October 12, 1999 after dislodging the civilian government of Nawaz
Sharif. There were two significant changes in the disposition of the senior military commanders during the
fourth phase of direct military rule. First, the military was no longer willing to stay on the sidelines and
viewed itself as critical to internal stability and continuity. It advocated a direct and constitutional role for
the top brass. Second, the military expanded its nonprofessional role to such an extent that it could not
give a free hand to the civilian political leaders.
The military has spread out in government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide ranging
commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health care, education,
and real estate development. It seeks assignments from the federal and provincial governments for civil
construction projects. Given the military’s expanded interests and its involvement in governance, its role
in Pakistan can be described as hegemonic.
The Musharraf Model:
General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff since October 1998, assumed power after his top
commanders dislodged the elected civilian government of Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999. He
designated himself as the Chief Executive and suspended the constitution to impose military rule, avoiding
the use of the term of martial law.
General Pervez Musharraf carefully tailored the transition to constitutional and civilian rule in 2002. The
underlying consideration was his staying on as an effective President in the post-military rule period and
the continuation of the policy measures adopted by his military regime. The transition process was
deigned to share power with a section of the political leaders rather than transfer power to civilian
political leaders.
He ensured his continuation in office before starting the transition process by holding a state managed
uncontested referendum on April 30, 2002 to get him elected as President for five years. This was followed
by the introduction of far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution to enhance his powers and to give a
constitutional cover to the role of the top brass in policy making through the issuance of the Legal
Framework Order (LFO) in August. Meanwhile a breakaway faction of the PML-Nawaz Sharif, labeled as the
PML-Quaid-i-Azam, was co-opted for partnership. The PML-Q enjoyed state patronage which enabled it to
emerge as the single largest party in the National Assembly and it obtained a clear majority in the Punjab
Provincial Assembly. The military regime’s major adversary, the PPP, came second in the National
Assembly and obtained the largest number of seats (not an absolute majority) in the Sindh Provincial
Assembly.
The Presidency and the intelligence agencies played an active role in creating the PML-Q led coalitions at
the federal level and in Sindh and Balochistan. In the Punjab, the PML-Q had a majority to form the
government. Thus, the National Assembly began to function on November 16 and General Pervez
Musharraf took the oath as the elected President for five years. The provincial governments were installed
in November-December and the Senate, upper house of the parliament, was elected in the last week of
February 2003 and resumed functioning on March 12, 2003, which marked the full restoration of the 1973
Constitution as amended by the LFO.
Pakistan thus returned to constitutional rule with elected parliament and provincial assemblies as well as
elected governments at the federal and provincial levels. However, the political arrangements were
dominated by the Presidency. President Pervez Musharraf not only exercised the enhanced powers under
the LFO but he also continued as the Army Chief—an unusual combination in a democratic polity-which
gave him an overriding clout in the polity.
The focal point of the post-2002 political order is President-Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf who
functions as an effective ruler, overshadowing the Prime Minister and the Parliament. This political
arrangement could be described as the Musharraf model of governance and political management. The
effective powers are concentrated in President-Army Chief Pervez Musharraf and his army/intelligence
affiliates who command the political system both at the federal and provincial levels. The establishment of
the National Security Council in April 2004 which provides a legal cover to the expanded role of the top
brass of the military further reinforces the position of the President and the brass of the military.
The Musharraf model emphasizes the unity of command, centralization, management rather than
participation and the guardianship of the political process by the military. The elected government and the
parliament have to function within the space made available to them by the top commanders. The
political clout of the civilian leaders depends on their ability to work in harmony with the top generals.
The parliament and the provincial assemblies have not been able to acquire an autonomous and assertive
role in the polity. The effective power at both federal and provincial levels is located outside the
parliament and the provincial assemblies. Consequently, the seekers of state power and resources focus on
the presidency and its Army/intelligence and bureaucratic affiliates. The assemblies have done limited
legislative work and their functioning has been marred by bitter exchanges between the government and
the opposition, violation of parliamentary norms, the quorum problem and boycotts by the opposition
parties. The members complain about the frequent absence of the ministers from the two houses of the
parliament and the inadequacy of the answers by the government to their questions. The assemblies have
to make a real effort to fulfill even the constitutional requirement of the minimum working days in a year.
The prime ministerial changes in June 2004 (Zafarullah Jamali to Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein) and August
(Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein to Shaukat Aziz) demonstrated the weakness of the National Assembly and the
ruling coalition led by the PML. The decision for these changes was made in the presidency and the
National Assembly and the PML simply endorsed it. Jamali got his budget passed from the parliament
which amounted to a vote of confidence for his government. Two days later, he had to quit under pressure
from the Presidency. The PML accepted the change and his entire cabinet was reappointed under the new
prime minister.
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